feat(dkimsign): sign messages per From domain with RSA or Ed25519 keys

- Add Signer choosing the key by the From address domain: exact match, then parent domains
- Sign list headers too, relaxed/relaxed sha256, never a body length limit
- Load PKCS#1 and PKCS#8 PEM keys, reject unusable files without echoing key material
- Leave messages without a matching key or a usable From untouched
This commit is contained in:
tgiachi 2026-11-09 19:58:07 +01:00
commit 141c5d98e9
4 changed files with 488 additions and 1 deletions

4
go.mod
View file

@ -11,13 +11,15 @@ require (
require (
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/emersion/go-msgauth v0.7.0 // indirect
github.com/emersion/go-sasl v0.0.0-20241020182733-b788ff22d5a6 // indirect
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.24 // indirect
github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.21.0 // indirect
modernc.org/libc v1.80.1 // indirect
modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
modernc.org/memory v1.12.1 // indirect

5
go.sum
View file

@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.1.0 h1:dbKTrvD0klcbBV/h4AWJdMuZogJACoMlvWIWZ5b2
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.1.0/go.mod h1:hc1CvRkJMsgxqjmjMQF3QNRAZBwY8AXBAzKYoSX9sFI=
github.com/emersion/go-message v0.18.2 h1:rl55SQdjd9oJcIoQNhubD2Acs1E6IzlZISRTK7x/Lpg=
github.com/emersion/go-message v0.18.2/go.mod h1:XpJyL70LwRvq2a8rVbHXikPgKj8+aI0kGdHlg16ibYA=
github.com/emersion/go-msgauth v0.7.0 h1:vj2hMn6KhFtW41kshIBTXvp6KgYSqpA/ZN9Pv4g1INc=
github.com/emersion/go-msgauth v0.7.0/go.mod h1:mmS9I6HkSovrNgq0HNXTeu8l3sRAAuQ9RMvbM4KU7Ck=
github.com/emersion/go-sasl v0.0.0-20241020182733-b788ff22d5a6 h1:oP4q0fw+fOSWn3DfFi4EXdT+B+gTtzx8GC9xsc26Znk=
github.com/emersion/go-sasl v0.0.0-20241020182733-b788ff22d5a6/go.mod h1:iL2twTeMvZnrg54ZoPDNfJaJaqy0xIQFuBdrLsmspwQ=
github.com/emersion/go-smtp v0.25.1 h1:y6nzefT6PtFeMItFw97GX/ZCkVbh0rqSXG8b3ang8/w=
@ -21,6 +23,8 @@ github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec/go.mod h1:qq
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.4.13/go.mod h1:6yULJ656Px+3vBD8DxQVa3kxgyrAnzto9xy5taEt/CY=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0 h1:ihbySMvVjLAeSH1IbfcRTkD/iNscyz8rGzjF/E5hV6U=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0/go.mod h1:kDsLvtWBEx7MV9tJOj9bnXsPbxwJQ6csT/x4KIN4Ssk=
golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4/go.mod h1:jJ57K6gSWd91VN4djpZkiMVwK6gcyfeH4XE8wZrZaV4=
golang.org/x/mod v0.8.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs=
golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0 h1:ICeL3t2L30ljSPHHxDnR4fqVcBt/zR2zJAb9juavmQg=
@ -51,6 +55,7 @@ golang.org/x/text v0.3.7/go.mod h1:u+2+/6zg+i71rQMx5EYifcz6MCKuco9NR6JIITiCfzQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.7.0/go.mod h1:mrYo+phRRbMaCq/xk9113O4dZlRixOauAjOtrjsXDZ8=
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0 h1:ScX5w1eTa3QqT8oi6+ziP7dTV1S2+ALU0bI+0zXKWiQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
golang.org/x/text v0.21.0/go.mod h1:4IBbMaMmOPCJ8SecivzSH54+73PCFmPWxNTLm+vZkEQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=

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@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
// Package dkimsign signs outgoing messages with DKIM.
//
// The signing domain comes from the address in the message's From header: a key
// for that exact domain, else a key for one of its parent domains (relaxed
// alignment). A message from a domain without a key is left unsigned.
package dkimsign
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/mail"
"os"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/emersion/go-msgauth/dkim"
)
// headerKeys are the header fields covered by the signature. The list headers
// are included so a recipient can trust the unsubscribe links. Received and
// Return-Path are left out: MTAs add them on the way.
var headerKeys = []string{
"From", "To", "Cc", "Subject", "Date", "Message-ID", "In-Reply-To", "References", "Reply-To",
"MIME-Version", "Content-Type", "Content-Transfer-Encoding",
"List-Id", "List-Post", "List-Unsubscribe", "List-Unsubscribe-Post",
}
var selectorRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9._-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?$`)
// Key is a signing key for one domain.
type Key struct {
Domain string
Selector string
Signer crypto.Signer // *rsa.PrivateKey or ed25519.PrivateKey
}
// Signer signs messages with the key that matches their From domain.
type Signer struct {
keys map[string]Key // by lowercase domain
}
// New builds a Signer. Domains must be unique.
func New(keys []Key) (*Signer, error) {
s := &Signer{keys: map[string]Key{}}
for _, k := range keys {
k.Domain = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(k.Domain), "."))
switch {
case k.Domain == "":
return nil, errors.New("dkim: a key needs a domain")
case !selectorRe.MatchString(k.Selector):
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dkim: invalid selector %q for %s", k.Selector, k.Domain)
case k.Signer == nil:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dkim: no private key for %s", k.Domain)
}
switch k.Signer.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dkim: unsupported key type for %s", k.Domain)
}
if _, dup := s.keys[k.Domain]; dup {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dkim: more than one key for %s", k.Domain)
}
s.keys[k.Domain] = k
}
return s, nil
}
// LoadKey reads a PEM private key file (PKCS#1 or PKCS#8; RSA or Ed25519).
func LoadKey(domain, selector, path string) (Key, error) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return Key{}, err
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(raw)
if block == nil {
return Key{}, fmt.Errorf("%s: not a PEM file", path)
}
var priv crypto.Signer
switch block.Type {
case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
k, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return Key{}, fmt.Errorf("%s: invalid RSA private key", path)
}
priv = k
case "PRIVATE KEY":
k, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return Key{}, fmt.Errorf("%s: invalid PKCS#8 private key", path)
}
switch k := k.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
priv = k
case ed25519.PrivateKey:
priv = k
default:
return Key{}, fmt.Errorf("%s: unsupported key type %T (use RSA or Ed25519)", path, k)
}
default:
return Key{}, fmt.Errorf("%s: unsupported PEM type %q", path, block.Type)
}
return Key{Domain: domain, Selector: selector, Signer: priv}, nil
}
// fromDomain returns the lowercase domain of the first address in From.
func fromDomain(msg []byte) (string, bool) {
m, err := mail.ReadMessage(bytes.NewReader(msg))
if err != nil {
return "", false
}
addrs, err := m.Header.AddressList("From")
if err != nil || len(addrs) == 0 {
return "", false
}
at := strings.LastIndex(addrs[0].Address, "@")
if at < 0 || at == len(addrs[0].Address)-1 {
return "", false
}
return strings.ToLower(addrs[0].Address[at+1:]), true
}
func (s *Signer) keyFor(domain string) (Key, bool) {
for {
if k, ok := s.keys[domain]; ok {
return k, true
}
i := strings.Index(domain, ".")
if i < 0 {
return Key{}, false
}
domain = domain[i+1:]
}
}
// Sign returns msg with a DKIM-Signature header in front. When no key applies
// (or the message has no usable From) it returns msg unchanged and no error.
func (s *Signer) Sign(msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {
domain, ok := fromDomain(msg)
if !ok {
return msg, nil
}
key, ok := s.keyFor(domain)
if !ok {
return msg, nil
}
var out bytes.Buffer
err := dkim.Sign(&out, bytes.NewReader(msg), &dkim.SignOptions{
Domain: key.Domain,
Selector: key.Selector,
Signer: key.Signer,
Hash: crypto.SHA256,
HeaderCanonicalization: dkim.CanonicalizationRelaxed,
BodyCanonicalization: dkim.CanonicalizationRelaxed,
HeaderKeys: headerKeys,
})
if err != nil {
return msg, fmt.Errorf("dkim sign for %s: %w", key.Domain, err)
}
return out.Bytes(), nil
}

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@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
package dkimsign
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/emersion/go-msgauth/dkim"
)
func rsaKey(t *testing.T, bits int) *rsa.PrivateKey {
t.Helper()
k, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, bits)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return k
}
// dnsRecord is the TXT record a receiver would find for a key.
func dnsRecord(t *testing.T, pub crypto.PublicKey) string {
t.Helper()
switch k := pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
der, _ := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(k)
return "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(der)
case ed25519.PublicKey:
return "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k)
}
t.Fatal("unsupported key")
return ""
}
// verify checks every DKIM signature of msg against a fake DNS with a single record.
func verify(t *testing.T, msg []byte, selector, domain string, pub crypto.PublicKey) []*dkim.Verification {
t.Helper()
vs, err := dkim.VerifyWithOptions(bytes.NewReader(msg), &dkim.VerifyOptions{
LookupTXT: func(name string) ([]string, error) {
if name == selector+"._domainkey."+domain {
return []string{dnsRecord(t, pub)}, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("no such record: " + name)
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
}
return vs
}
func mustVerify(t *testing.T, msg []byte, selector, domain string, pub crypto.PublicKey) {
t.Helper()
vs := verify(t, msg, selector, domain, pub)
if len(vs) != 1 || vs[0].Err != nil || vs[0].Domain != domain {
t.Fatalf("verification: %+v", vs)
}
}
func message(from string) []byte {
return []byte("From: " + from + "\r\nTo: dev@lists.example.org\r\nSubject: Hello list\r\nDate: Mon, 01 Jan 2024 10:00:00 +0000\r\n" +
"Message-ID: <1@x>\r\nList-Id: Dev <dev.lists.example.org>\r\nList-Unsubscribe: <mailto:dev+leave@lists.example.org>\r\n" +
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\r\n\r\nthe body\r\nsecond line\r\n")
}
func newSigner(t *testing.T, keys ...Key) *Signer {
t.Helper()
s, err := New(keys)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return s
}
func TestSignRSAAndVerify(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
in := message("Alice via Dev <dev@lists.example.org>")
out, err := s.Sign(in)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !bytes.HasPrefix(out, []byte("DKIM-Signature:")) || !bytes.HasSuffix(out, in) {
t.Fatalf("the signature header goes first and the original follows untouched:\n%s", out)
}
mustVerify(t, out, "mail", "lists.example.org", &k.PublicKey)
sig := string(out[:bytes.Index(out, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))])
for _, want := range []string{"a=rsa-sha256", "c=relaxed/relaxed", "d=lists.example.org", "s=mail"} {
if !strings.Contains(sig, want) {
t.Errorf("signature lacks %q:\n%s", want, sig)
}
}
if strings.Contains(sig, "l=") {
t.Error("a body length limit lets attackers append text: never use l=")
}
}
func TestSignEd25519AndVerify(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "ed", Signer: priv})
out, err := s.Sign(message("dev@lists.example.org"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
mustVerify(t, out, "ed", "lists.example.org", pub)
}
func TestSignedHeadersCoverTheListHeaders(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
out, _ := s.Sign(message("dev@lists.example.org"))
sig := strings.ToLower(string(out[:bytes.Index(out, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))]))
for _, h := range []string{"from", "to", "subject", "date", "message-id", "list-id", "list-unsubscribe", "content-type"} {
if !regexpHas(sig, h) {
t.Errorf("%s must be signed: %s", h, sig)
}
}
}
var hTag = regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)(?:^|[;\s])h=([^;]*)`)
func regexpHas(sig, header string) bool {
m := hTag.FindStringSubmatch(sig)
if m == nil {
return false
}
for _, h := range strings.Split(strings.Join(strings.Fields(m[1]), ""), ":") {
if h == header {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func TestTamperingBreaksTheSignature(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
out, _ := s.Sign(message("dev@lists.example.org"))
for name, tampered := range map[string][]byte{
"body": bytes.Replace(out, []byte("the body"), []byte("the BODY!"), 1),
"subject": bytes.Replace(out, []byte("Subject: Hello list"), []byte("Subject: Hello you"), 1),
"list-unsubscribe": bytes.Replace(out, []byte("List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:dev+leave@lists.example.org>\r\n"), nil, 1),
"appended text": append(append([]byte{}, out...), []byte("extra line\r\n")...),
} {
vs := verify(t, tampered, "mail", "lists.example.org", &k.PublicKey)
if len(vs) != 1 || vs[0].Err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: a modified message must not verify: %+v", name, vs)
}
}
}
func TestUnsignedWhenThereIsNoKeyOrNoUsableFrom(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
for name, in := range map[string][]byte{
"other domain": message("someone@elsewhere.test"),
"no From header": []byte("Subject: x\r\n\r\nbody\r\n"),
"unparsable From": []byte("From: not an address\r\nSubject: x\r\n\r\nbody\r\n"),
"empty message": {},
"not a message": []byte("garbage"),
} {
out, err := s.Sign(in)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(out, in) {
t.Errorf("%s: want the message back untouched, got %q %v", name, out, err)
}
}
// No keys at all.
empty := newSigner(t)
in := message("dev@lists.example.org")
if out, err := empty.Sign(in); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(out, in) {
t.Fatalf("no keys: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSigningDomainSelection(t *testing.T) {
parent, sub := rsaKey(t, 2048), rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t,
Key{Domain: "example.org", Selector: "p", Signer: parent},
Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "s", Signer: sub},
)
// Exact match wins over the parent.
out, _ := s.Sign(message("dev@lists.example.org"))
mustVerify(t, out, "s", "lists.example.org", &sub.PublicKey)
// A subdomain without its own key is signed with the parent (relaxed alignment).
out, _ = s.Sign(message("dev@news.lists.example.org"))
mustVerify(t, out, "s", "lists.example.org", &sub.PublicKey)
out, _ = s.Sign(message("dev@other.example.org"))
mustVerify(t, out, "p", "example.org", &parent.PublicKey)
// A different domain with a similar suffix is not a subdomain.
if out, _ := s.Sign(message("dev@notexample.org")); bytes.HasPrefix(out, []byte("DKIM-Signature")) {
t.Fatal("notexample.org is not a subdomain of example.org")
}
}
func TestDomainMatchingIgnoresCaseAndDisplayNames(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "Lists.Example.ORG", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
out, _ := s.Sign(message(`"someone@elsewhere.test via Dev" <DEV@LISTS.example.org>`))
mustVerify(t, out, "mail", "lists.example.org", &k.PublicKey)
// A key domain named only in the display name must not be used.
out, _ = s.Sign(message(`"dev@lists.example.org" <x@elsewhere.test>`))
if bytes.HasPrefix(out, []byte("DKIM-Signature")) {
t.Fatal("the domain comes from the address, not the display name")
}
}
func TestNewRejectsBadKeySets(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
for name, keys := range map[string][]Key{
"duplicate domain": {{Domain: "a.org", Selector: "x", Signer: k}, {Domain: "A.org", Selector: "y", Signer: k}},
"empty domain": {{Domain: "", Selector: "x", Signer: k}},
"empty selector": {{Domain: "a.org", Selector: "", Signer: k}},
"no signer": {{Domain: "a.org", Selector: "x"}},
"selector with a space": {{Domain: "a.org", Selector: "my sel", Signer: k}},
} {
if _, err := New(keys); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: want an error", name)
}
}
}
func TestSignIsSafeForConcurrentUse(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
out, err := s.Sign(message("dev@lists.example.org"))
if err != nil || !bytes.HasPrefix(out, []byte("DKIM-Signature")) {
t.Errorf("concurrent sign: %v", err)
}
}()
}
wg.Wait()
}
func TestBigMessagesAreSigned(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
s := newSigner(t, Key{Domain: "lists.example.org", Selector: "mail", Signer: k})
in := append(message("dev@lists.example.org"), bytes.Repeat([]byte("0123456789abcdef\r\n"), 300_000)...)
out, err := s.Sign(in)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
mustVerify(t, out, "mail", "lists.example.org", &k.PublicKey)
}
func writePEM(t *testing.T, typ string, der []byte) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "key.pem")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: der}), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return path
}
func TestLoadKeyFormats(t *testing.T) {
k := rsaKey(t, 2048)
pkcs8, _ := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(k)
_, ed, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
edDER, _ := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(ed)
for name, path := range map[string]string{
"rsa pkcs1": writePEM(t, "RSA PRIVATE KEY", x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(k)),
"rsa pkcs8": writePEM(t, "PRIVATE KEY", pkcs8),
"ed25519 p8": writePEM(t, "PRIVATE KEY", edDER),
} {
key, err := LoadKey("lists.example.org", "mail", path)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: %v", name, err)
continue
}
s := newSigner(t, key)
out, err := s.Sign(message("dev@lists.example.org"))
if err != nil || !bytes.HasPrefix(out, []byte("DKIM-Signature")) {
t.Errorf("%s: loaded key does not sign: %v", name, err)
}
}
}
func TestLoadKeyRejectsUnusableFiles(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"garbage": func() string {
p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "k")
os.WriteFile(p, []byte("not a pem"), 0o600)
return p
}(),
"wrong type": writePEM(t, "CERTIFICATE", []byte("x")),
"truncated der": writePEM(t, "RSA PRIVATE KEY", []byte{1, 2, 3}),
"missing file": "/nonexistent/key.pem",
}
for name, path := range cases {
if _, err := LoadKey("a.org", "mail", path); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: want an error", name)
}
}
// The error never contains key material.
_, err := LoadKey("a.org", "mail", writePEM(t, "RSA PRIVATE KEY", []byte{1, 2, 3}))
if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "AQID") {
t.Fatal("do not echo key bytes in errors")
}
}