fix(security): API token strength and brute-force lockout
- Refuse an API token under 24 characters or with whitespace at startup, without echoing it - Lock an address out for 5 minutes after 10 wrong or missing tokens in 5 minutes (429 with Retry-After) - Ignore X-Forwarded-For for the lockout, forget idle addresses - Document both
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@ -213,6 +213,10 @@ lists.example.org lmtp:inet:127.0.0.1:2424
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and `Reply-To` come from the header; so a post whose header names someone else (or has no usable `From`, or several
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addresses) is held for moderation instead of delivered, with the reason shown to the admin (API, CLI, UI). Let Postfix
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reject forged senders too (SPF, DKIM, DMARC checks on inbound mail).
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- **API token.** `parsimony serve` refuses a token shorter than 24 characters or containing whitespace
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(`openssl rand -hex 24` makes a good one). After 10 wrong or missing tokens within 5 minutes an address is
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locked out for 5 minutes (HTTP 429, valid token included). The address is the TCP peer: behind a reverse proxy
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every client shares the proxy's address, so rate-limit at the proxy as well.
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- The API and the admin UI use one bearer token and no TLS: put them behind a reverse proxy with TLS and keep the `api`
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listener private.
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