Behind a reverse proxy every visitor shared the proxy's address, so the
whole site got 10 signups an hour and one person could block everyone.
Over IPv6 each address of a /64 was a fresh key, so the limit did not
bind and the map grew by one entry per address.
- web.trusted_proxies (addresses or CIDR ranges, default empty) is
validated at load and passed to the web handler. X-Forwarded-For is
read only when the TCP peer is a trusted proxy; the client is then the
right-most entry that is not itself a trusted proxy. An empty or
malformed header falls back to the peer. With no trusted proxy the
behaviour is unchanged: the header is ignored.
- IPv6 clients are keyed by their /64, IPv4 clients by address.
- The limiter remembers at most 100000 clients. When full it sweeps
expired entries first and otherwise answers 429 to new clients until
the oldest window ends, instead of growing.
- GET /subscribe/{address}: email field, an off-screen honeypot named website,
a Subscribe button; 404 (the usual page) for a private, closed or unknown list
- POST /subscribe/{address}: one plain ASCII address of at most 254 characters,
else the form again (400) with the escaped typed value; a filled honeypot gets
the success page and nothing happens; otherwise Router.RequestJoin and always
the same neutral page, so a member, a rate limited address or an unknown
one cannot be told apart; the body is limited to 4 KiB (413)
- at most 10 POSTs per hour per TCP peer address (X-Forwarded-For is ignored),
then 429 with Retry-After; idle addresses are swept; the clock is injectable
- a Subscribe link on the archive page of a list that qualifies, nothing else
- no-store on the subscribe pages; the CSP is unchanged
- tests for each of these, including escaping, enumeration, the limit and its expiry