Registration, login and the admin's create-user call take `email` instead of
`username`, and the user object returns `email`. The address is checked for its
shape (a plain address, no display name, at most 254 bytes), trimmed, lowercased
and unique. Sonda sends no mail and does not verify it.
- Migration 0018 renames the users column (and the PostgreSQL index); values are
kept, so an account made before keeps its plain name and still logs in with it
(login does not check the shape).
- Error code username_taken becomes email_taken; the JWT claim is now `email`,
so access tokens issued before the upgrade are refused once and clients refresh.
- OpenAPI spec, README, the web login form (type email), strings (en, it) and
the generated API types follow.
Closes#65
- fix: a listen from a deleted account is answered 401 before the track or the
duration is looked at, so a client that signs out on 401 does it whatever
else is wrong with the request (UserExists on the store)
- docs: one event per play, sent when the play ends or is abandoned, with one
idempotency key per play. An event cannot be upgraded afterwards: a key that
was already used is ignored even if the type or duration differ, and a new
key would count the same play twice. The README no longer says to report at
20 seconds, which led straight into that trap, and no longer hard-codes the
minimum
- test: the SQL filter at exactly the threshold and just under it, the order of
events within the same second, the order of checks for a deleted account
- fix(spec): album.artist and track.album are real nullable objects (OpenAPI
3.0 only honours nullable next to a type); the stream documents 304 on HEAD,
412, If-Unmodified-Since and multipart/byteranges answers
- fix(spec): passwords and idempotency keys are measured in bytes, an overlap
between libraries is a 400, a library PATCH needs a name or a path, limit 0
means the default, login has no format rules of its own, and the wording about
signing out says that issued access tokens live until they expire
- fix(auth): the Bearer scheme is matched ignoring case (RFC 7235)
- fix(listening): a listen with the access token of a deleted account is a 401
instead of a database error
- fix(docs): the docs pages answer HEAD and carry X-Frame-Options, a CSP
frame-ancestors, nosniff and no-referrer, since people paste their token there
- test: error codes are asserted in every error case; every accepted request is
validated against the spec too; HEAD and 3xx answers are checked by hand
because the validator skips them; the stream Content-Type must be one the
spec lists; a scan held mid-way proves the scan_running conflicts; null album
and null album artist, a vanished file, multi-range, 412 and HEAD 304 are
exercised. Verified by breaking the code and the spec on purpose
- fix: open the audio file through os.Root with O_NONBLOCK. A FIFO under a
stored path used to block the request forever in open(2) before the
regular-file check could run; now it is refused immediately
- fix: os.Root also removes the gap between checking the path and opening it,
so a symlink swapped in at the last moment cannot leave the library
(absolute symlinks are refused even when they point back inside)
- fix(api): only "Authorization: Bearer <token>" is accepted again. The query
token change had made a bare token in the header pass on every route
- fix(config): library.roots must be absolute paths; a relative root made
every stream fail and depended on the directory sondad started in
- test: FIFO and symlink-to-FIFO without hanging, bare and non-Bearer headers
on a normal route and on the stream route, relative roots
- fix(storage): lock the user row when rotating a refresh token or changing a
password, so on PostgreSQL a token minted during a password change can no
longer survive the revoke-everything that runs at the same time
- fix(auth): a replay of a just-rotated refresh token (two tabs, a retrying
client) now fails without revoking the winner's new token; only a replay
after RefreshReuseGrace is treated as theft and revokes every session
- fix(auth): changing or resetting a password and revoking the user's refresh
tokens now happen in one transaction
- docs(auth): note that the last-admin rule relies on a single instance
- test: password change racing with a refresh (25 rounds, both databases),
grace window, winner's token still valid after concurrent rotation
- feat(auth): short-lived access tokens plus rotating refresh tokens stored as
SHA-256 hashes; replaying a spent token revokes every session of that user
- feat(auth): is_admin flag; the first registered user is the admin and the
last admin can be neither demoted nor deleted
- feat(api): POST /auth/refresh, /auth/logout, /auth/password and GET /auth/me
- feat(api): admin-only GET/POST /users, PATCH /users/{id}, PUT
/users/{id}/password and DELETE /users/{id}; the admin check reads the role
from the database on every call
- feat(api): starting a library scan is now admin-only
- feat(storage): users and refresh token repositories for SQLite and
PostgreSQL (migration 0004; the oldest existing account becomes admin)
- feat(config): auth.access_ttl_minutes and auth.refresh_ttl_hours replace
auth.token_ttl_hours
- test: rotation, reuse detection, concurrent rotation with a single winner,
admin rules, role changes taking effect immediately