- the API + admin UI server and the public web server get ReadTimeout 30s,
WriteTimeout 60s and IdleTimeout 120s next to ReadHeaderTimeout
- the archive import extends its own read and write deadlines to 30
minutes with http.ResponseController, so a big mbox is not cut
- tests: a stalled body and an idle connection are cut on both servers,
an import longer than the default timeouts succeeds, fields are pinned
- README: document the limits and timeouts
- discardReason drops only the own-List-Id loop, Auto-Submitted: auto-replied and Precedence: auto_reply; auto-generated, auto-notified and unknown values take the normal path (membership, From, moderation)
- join, leave and confirm commands ignore (250, token kept) a null sender, any Auto-Submitted other than no, Precedence auto_reply/bulk/junk and the list's own List-Id
- tests: loop_test, new auto_test, ingest LMTP test
- README: loops and robots paragraph in the security notes
- message/global-delivery-status (RFC 6533) counts like delivery-status.
- Only the first delivery-status part is read.
- A malformed delivery-status part does not count.
- Drop the redundant empty-boundary check: the multipart reader already
fails on it.
- README: only RFC 3464 reports with Action: failed and a
recipient-unknown code count; bounces count for 30 days.
- openapi: Member.disabled and bounce_count say the count is recent.
- walk at most 10 nested multipart levels and 100 parts, then use what
was found: the post is still delivered, the archive stores less
- read a text part only while it can still become the body, and stop at
the first non-blank plain part, so memory stays near MaxBody
- a Date more than 24 hours after the time of parsing becomes that time;
a Date before 1990 is treated as missing
- tests: 20000-level nesting finishes fast, exact limits, allocation
bound, pathological HTML, date clamps
- Add members.bounce_at (unix time of the last counted bounce) with an
additive migration; existing counts get 0, so they are treated as old.
- RecordHardBounce restarts the count at 1 when the last bounce is older
than BounceWindow (30 days); a disabled member stays disabled.
- Tests for the window boundary, the restart and the migration of an
old database.
- Parse the bounce as an RFC 3464 report: multipart/report with a
message/delivery-status (or message/global-delivery-status) part.
- Count a hard bounce only for a per-recipient block with Action: failed
and a status of 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.6 or 5.1.10.
- Policy and content rejections (5.7.x), full mailboxes (5.2.x), delays,
4.x.x and Status lines in plain text or quoted text no longer count.
- Tests with real-looking DSNs for each class, quoted text and multiple
recipient blocks; the VERP token check is unchanged.
- foreign_keys, busy_timeout(5000) and WAL now come from the DSN, not from
an Exec on one connection
- test: every connection of a 2-connection pool, in memory and on disk
- Name the refused command in the error (MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA) so the queue tells a refused sender from a refused recipient
- Test a refusal of the DATA command itself, SMTPUTF8 for non-ASCII addresses and oldest-first threads
- Add SENDER and FROM columns to held ls, flagging a From header that differs from the sender
- Show the From header and a badge in the Held tab; keep the envelope sender visible
- Store subject, From header and size when a message is held; ListHeld returns the summary only
- Cap one held message at 10 MiB (ErrHeldTooLarge) and the bytes held per list at 200 MiB (ErrHeldFull)
- Summarise the messages already held when migrating an existing database, one at a time
- Show the From header and whether it differs from the envelope sender in the held API
- Thread listings no longer load the bodies of the thread
- Issue MAIL, RCPT and DATA one by one so a failure knows which command it answers
- Treat 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.6 and 5.1.10 as 'no such mailbox' only in answer to RCPT TO
- A refused sender (5.1.x answering MAIL FROM) or a refusal after DATA keeps the delivery as failed and never strikes members
- Ignore a QUIT error once the relay accepted the message: it caused duplicate deliveries
- Read the relay password and CA file at startup; refuse to start on an unusable one
- Pass TLS mode, server name, CA pool, credentials and EHLO name to the SMTP relay
- Default the EHLO name to the host name
- Test an authenticating STARTTLS relay, a wrong password (mail stays queued) and the startup checks
- Document external relays in the README and the example config
- Add relay.tls, server_name, ca_file, helo, username and password_file
- Refuse credentials over a clear connection to a remote relay, naming the setting to change
- Read the password and CA bundle from files; an empty or missing file is an error
- Check that relay.addr is host:port
- Add relay TLS modes: none (default), starttls (required, never downgraded) and implicit tls
- Verify the certificate (system roots, optional CA pool and server name), TLS 1.2 minimum
- Add AUTH PLAIN, refused over a clear connection to a remote relay
- Report a wrong password or a relay that wants authentication as a temporary error, so mail waits instead of failing for good
- Add a configurable EHLO name, validated against line breaks
- Arm the context watcher before EHLO so a silent relay cannot hang a send
- Test the lockout, the confirmation cap and Retry-After with literal numbers, not the constants
- Test that failed deliveries are listed before the most retried ones
- Add the reason field to a test fixture so tsc -b passes
- Use a 24+ character API token and an lmtp.allow list in the end-to-end stack
- Describe failed deliveries in the README
- Add failed deliveries: a permanent refusal by the relay (policy, size, line length) or the 3-day give-up marks the delivery failed, with the reason, and never retries it
- Keep failed deliveries listed for a week, then purge them and their stored message
- A non-existent mailbox still drops the delivery and counts a hard bounce
- Migrate the outbox table
- Release removes the held message and queues its deliveries in one transaction
- Of several simultaneous approvals one wins, the others get 404
- Extract the thread-root computation and test its linearity without the database (fast under -race)
- Cap the held queue at 500 per list and drop messages nobody moderated for 30 days
- Answer 452 when it is full, so a legitimate sender retries and a spam run goes away
- Refuse an API token under 24 characters or with whitespace at startup, without echoing it
- Lock an address out for 5 minutes after 10 wrong or missing tokens in 5 minutes (429 with Retry-After)
- Ignore X-Forwarded-For for the lockout, forget idle addresses
- Document both
- Drop posts that carry the list's own List-Id, Auto-Submitted other than no, or Precedence: auto_reply
- Acknowledge them to the MTA instead of refusing, so no bounce starts another loop
- Never archive, hold or queue a discarded message
- Judge membership on the envelope sender and require the From header to name the same address
- Hold mismatches (and missing, unparsable or multiple From addresses) for the admin instead of delivering
- Record why a message was held: new held.reason column, migrated, shown in the API, CLI and UI
- Accept an empty message in the held queue
- Document who may post
- Add lmtp.allow: clients outside the list are dropped before the greeting (TCP only)
- Validate the list at load, naming the bad entry
- Warn at startup when LMTP is reachable beyond the machine and no list is set
- Stop publishing the LMTP port in the README and the example config; add Security notes
- Require Go 1.27.3: fixes the standard library vulnerabilities govulncheck reported
- Add the GPLv3 text and the licence note
- Move shadcn to devDependencies: npm audit finds nothing in production dependencies
- Add make lint (staticcheck) to go-ci and a separate vuln job in CI
- Fix the staticcheck warning in a test
- Check that every message the list delivered through Postfix is signed with the list domain and still verifies, and that edits break it
- Run dkim keygen, record and the no-overwrite rule inside the read-only container
- Document DKIM, SPF and DMARC in the README and show the dkim block in the example config
- Cover headers outside the signed list changing in transit, quoted local parts with @, signing errors and lowercase domains
- Ignore *.pem so a private key is never committed
- Create a signing key (mode 0600, never overwritten without --force) and print the DNS record and the config snippet
- Print the record of an existing key, split in DNS-sized strings
- Check that DNS publishes the key that matches the private key file
- Work offline of the API: no token needed
- Load the keys at startup and refuse to start on a broken one
- Sign every outgoing message, confirmation mail included, with the key of its From domain
- Send unsigned when the domain has no key
- Add Signer choosing the key by the From address domain: exact match, then parent domains
- Sign list headers too, relaxed/relaxed sha256, never a body length limit
- Load PKCS#1 and PKCS#8 PEM keys, reject unusable files without echoing key material
- Leave messages without a matching key or a usable From untouched
- Import a Mailman-style mbox through the CLI inside the container: encoded headers, multipart, escaped From lines, threading, idempotence
- Check accent-insensitive search and the public page hiding addresses
- Document the migration from Mailman in the README and the endpoint in OpenAPI
- Cover the CRLF separator line, cycle roots entered from outside, linear rethreading of long chains
- Cover a read error mid-import, the "and N more" lines, and the mbox content type
- Cover clearing the previous result and the capped error list in the UI
- Add upload of an mbox file with a summary of imported, already present and failed messages
- List the first failing messages and refresh the archive
- Stream the file as the raw request body